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A COURT DIVIDED 
SHUBHA GHOSH 
Patent law has gained prominence over the past few decades. Unfortu-
nately, this prominence has not resulted in more satisfying or coherent patent 
policy. As former Solicitor General Seth Waxman reminds us, the Supreme 
Court has granted certiorari on more patent law petitions as a percentage of 
their otherwise shrinking docket. In addition, news, mostly real, sometimes 
fake, about scandalous patent cases and dubious grants of patents have made 
the public more aware of this technical, specialized area of the law. Not co-
incidentally, entrepreneurship, start-up culture, and technology commercial-
ization have become buzzwords as have an information economy, economic 
development, and winner-takes-all markets. Mr. Waxman’s essay connects 
these various dots into his explanation for the increased attention by the Su-
preme Court on patent law. 
Despite the attention, sophisticated courts and market watchers wonder 
whether the law has actually improved. Progress is patent’s unrealized prom-
ise. But progress’ elusiveness is a consequence of the difficulty of measuring 
when the law, the market, and the world has in fact become better. One indi-
cation of the contested meaning of progress is the division within the Federal 
Circuit. Mr. Waxman points out that the Supreme Court has reviewed more 
patent cases in order to police the Federal Circuit, the specialized appellate 
court established in 1982 to review patent appeals.1 Since patent appeals are 
channeled through one appellate court, Mr. Waxman reasons, there are no 
circuit splits for the Supreme Court to resolve.2 But this argument ignores 
the splits within the Federal Circuit, as revealed in many en banc decisions, 
most noticeably in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l.3 The Federal Cir-
cuit is a court divided. This division is one reason why patent law has taken 
up a larger part of the Supreme Court’s docket recently. 
 
 Crandall Melvin Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. 
 1.  See Seth P. Waxman, May You Live in Interesting Times: Patent Law in the Supreme Court, 
2017 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 214, 215 (2017). 
 2.  Waxman, supra note 1, at 219. 
 3.  134 S. Ct. 2347, 2349 (2014). 
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What is troubling about the Federal Circuit split and the Supreme 
Court’s mixed attempts at reconciliation is the lack of any normative guid-
ance for patent law. Scholars and practitioners question the grounding of 
many Supreme Court patent decisions in the Patent Act or in precedent. But 
equally troubling is the lack of any normative policy discussion about what 
patent law should secure. For example, in its Myriad decision,4 the Supreme 
Court opinion resorted to an abridged course on biotechnology to somehow 
justify its decision while ignoring any of the contested policy issues, such as 
access to genetic therapies and health care costs. The Court instead relied on 
the authority of science to buttress their ruling without engaging in the polit-
ical issues.5 Similarly, the Federal Circuit en banc decisions in Alice are frag-
mented and a fractious attempt to create a doctrinal rule on patentable subject 
matter based on the language and structure of the Patent Act.6 While the Su-
preme Court announces unanimous patent law decisions (with occasional 
dissenters), the authority of the superior Court only highlights the conten-
tiousness of the intermediate appellate court. 
As a court divided, the Federal Circuit has failed at its primary mission. 
Judge Marion T. Bennett described the legal background against which this 
Circuit was founded as one in which “technological innovation was being 
impeded by the lack of uniformity in the application of the patent laws.”7 For 
example, the Supreme Court has in the past several years expanded its juris-
prudence on patentable subject matter. The Federal Circuit has responded 
accordingly by more aggressively invalidating patents for failure to meet re-
quirements of patent eligibility. However, the Supreme Court’s mandate is 
not to invalidate patents, but to develop standards for understanding the con-
tours of the patentable subject matter requirement as separate from the other 
four requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, utility, and enablement. Es-
tablishing the independent legal significance of patentable subject matter re-
quires the development of consistent and predictable methods to assess eli-
gibility. 
The Supreme Court established a broad test in Alice. The test was a 
synthesis of its holdings in Bilski v. Kappos8 and in Mayo Collaborative Ser-
vices v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.9 and an attempt to develop a general 
test of methodology for determining patent eligibility in the areas of business 
 
 4.  Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 579 (2013). 
 5.  See id. 
 6.  CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013).  
 7.  ADVISORY COUNCIL, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, A 
HISTORY: 1990–2002, 10 (Kristin L. Yohannan eds., 2002). 
 8.  561 U.S. 593, 605 (2010). 
 9.  566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
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methods, software, and medical therapeutics and diagnostics.10 By announc-
ing a general test, the Court intended for this Circuit to develop the contours 
that provide substance to the stated two-part test. This substance is not dis-
tinct from a case-by-case assessment of patentable subject matter. Like the 
common-law method, this Circuit’s application of the Court’s two-part test 
must evolve into a coherent doctrine, sometimes tailored to a specific indus-
try, but also general enough to serve as a beacon for future patentees and 
examiners. Because of the need for coherence and the evolution of the law, 
even a decision labelled non-precedential can undermine legal development 
and the arc towards consistency and predictability. Future patentees and at-
torneys will not know whether the patents they enforce will be summarily 
rendered invalid under an inscrutable methodology. Trust in the patent sys-
tem is potentially eroded, and fields most affected by Alice and its progeny 
will potentially develop more slowly to the detriment of consumers and fu-
ture innovators. 
Scholars of innovation identify risk taking as the key to innovation. As 
Professor Robert Gordon summarizes the experience of innovators over 
time: 
 
[I]nnovators, particularly when acting by themselves 
or in small partnerships, are the ultimate risk-takers. Their 
inventions may lead them to create large firms, or their in-
ventions may be supplanted by alternatives that are more ef-
ficient and perform better. Or they may have a promising 
idea and fail to find a source of funding for development of 
their ideas. Invention at the level of the individual “is any-
thing but mechanical, automatic, and predictable. Chance 
plays a tremendous role.”11 
 
Professor Gordon identifies the pharmaceutical industry as one of the 
key sectors where innovation will be critical in the current technology revo-
lution shaping the economy. He notes that “pharmaceutical research has 
reached a brick wall of rapidly increasing costs and declining benefits.”12 He 
includes medical advances within this claim. Although Professor Gordon 
points to regulatory burdens as raising the costs of medical innovation, he 
 
 10.  Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2350 (2014) 
 11.  ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH 570 (2016). 
 12.  Id. at 594. 
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also points to the rise of large firms and the decline of a democratic culture 
of innovation fostered by the patent system.13 
A divided Federal Circuit exacerbates the risks of innovation. It also 
calls into question the expertise of the court. Judge Rader, in an odd appendix 
labelled “additional reflections” to his en banc opinion in Alice, mourned the 
loss of collegiality of the Federal Circuit: 
 
In the twenty-fifth year of my judicial service, I am 
wont to reflect on my early judicial experience in search of 
the confidence in the correctness of my judicial views that I 
then enjoyed. . . . 
Therefore, I could only describe my emotion as sur-
prise that my senior colleagues on the panel, Judges New-
man and Lourie, struggled mightily. The author for the court 
performed impressive feats of intellectual acrobatics trying 
to gain some handhold to show that the mathematic equa-
tions in the method had some physical connection and no 
preemptive effect, whatever those concepts mean (and I still 
do not know if they have any meaning, let alone what that 
meaning might be). . . . 
I enjoy good writing and a good mystery, but I doubt 
that innovation is promoted when subjective and empty 
words like “contribution” or “inventiveness” are offered up 
by the courts to determine investment, resource allocation, 
and business decisions. Again, it is almost . . . well, “obvi-
ous” . . . to note that when all else fails, it makes sense to 
consult the simplicity, clarity, and directness of the statute. 
As I start my next quarter century of judicial experi-
ence, I am sure that one day I will reflect on this moment as 
well. I can only hope it is a brighter reflection than I encoun-
ter today.14 
 
It is hard to know how to respond to such a cri de coeur. One natural 
question is what was the basis for the solidarity that Judge Rader sees as 
dissolving. The judges on the Federal Circuit are joined by a technical back-
ground combined with training in law. They are members of the patent bar, 
or traditionally have been. Their common expertise and shared professional 
 
 13.  Id. at 574. 
 14.  CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1333–36 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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experience, Judge Rader may be suggesting, should make their judgments 
more unified and predictable. 
But perhaps the shared expertise is a myth. Invention comes from many 
fields. There are eighteen judges on the Federal Circuit.15 There are more 
than thirteen scientific or technical fields of specialty, as any university 
course catalog will bear witness. Sometimes judges in the same field of ex-
pertise reach different conclusions of law in the same case. Even shared 
membership of a bar cannot impose solidarity. Differences of opinion, of 
knowledge, of judgment is what oils the wheels of legal process. So, Judge 
Rader waxes nostalgic for a false sense of unity, one that is ever elusive, 
especially in the face of foundational questions such as what is patentable 
subject matter. 
With its expanded review of patent decisions, the Supreme Court has 
entered the fray. But can the superior Court’s intervention offer any basis for 
reconciliation? There are only so many tools available. As Mr. Waxman 
points out, the Supreme Court has recourse to common law judging, revert-
ing to concepts of reasonableness and its own precedent (as opposed to those 
of the Federal Circuit) in order to bring light to the darkness.16 But the light 
of the common law is often a dim one. In the patent area, we witness the 
Court resorting to open ended standards as a counter to blunt rules. Terms 
like “common sense” and “flexibility” serve to provide guidance for the Fed-
eral Circuit, district courts, and the USPTO in implementing the statutory 
language of the Patent Act. Unfortunately, such open-endedness has been the 
object of scholarly criticism and frustration for practitioners as the Federal 
Circuit seems to move to a rigid position of being overly skeptical of what 
inventions fall into patentable subject matter. The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Bilski begets the torpor of the en banc opinion in Alice. 
Deference to Congress is another tool available to the Supreme Court. 
We see such deference when the Court adopts a plain meaning approach to 
the Patent Act. In KSR v. Teleflex, for example, the Court relies on the lan-
guage of section 103, combined with its interpretation in Graham, to strike 
down the Federal Circuit’s rule-like application of the “teach, suggest, moti-
vate” approach to nonobviousness.17 With respect to patentable subject mat-
ter, the Court is in a quandary as it confronts the seemingly broad language 
of Section 101 and the weight of its own precedent, which had carved out 
 
 15.  Judges, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/kathleen-m-omalley-circuit-judge.html (last visited March 7, 
2018). 
 16.  See Waxman, supra note 1, at 222. 
 17.  550 US 398, 399–400 (2007). 
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exceptions based on policy. Deference to Congress is brushed aside, or so it 
seems. A plain meaning approach does not mean a rigid literalism. Arguably, 
the carve-outs within Section 101 set forth in Supreme Court precedent rest 
on a close reading of the words: process, machine, composition of matter, 
manufacture. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, for example, the Court adopted a 
broad view of patentable subject matter, relying on language in the legisla-
tive history to find that a living organism is a composition of matter.18 The 
recent spate of decisions limiting patentable subject matter is consistent with 
the Court’s interpretation of the Patent Act in Chakrabarty. The focus, how-
ever, is on the complexities of the meaning of the word, process. 
Judge Rader should appreciate this plain meaning approach. In his “ad-
ditional considerations” in Alice, the then Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit 
urged his colleagues, and by implication all parties engaged in patent law, to 
“follow the statute.”19 But the Supreme Court’s patentable subject matter ju-
risprudence shows the problems with a plain meaning approach. Reasonable 
minds can differ as to meaning of words, often with resort to history and 
tradition to guide interpretation. History and tradition, however, do not pro-
vide clarity. The problem is that plain meaning is unmoored from any nor-
mative considerations of the purposes underlying patent law. Eluding nor-
mative considerations to identify a seemingly neutral and objective meaning 
is the source of the problem in the current patentable subject matter jurispru-
dence. 
To develop this point, first consider how the current Supreme Court 
scrutiny of patent law compares with the patent-skepticism of Justice Doug-
las. This comparison sheds light not only on the errors in the Court’s Kimble 
decision,20 but also on the debates over patentable subject matter. The com-
parison also leads to the conclusion of this Comment: the Federal Circuit is 
a court divided because the normative underpinnings of patent law are con-
tested but unexamined. 
Justice Douglas’ well-known suspicion of patents reflected a general 
populist, anti-corporate outlook, nurtured by the concentration of wealth that 
allegedly caused the Great Depression and the New Deal redistributive pol-
icies that were the cure. It may be an exaggeration to say that during Justice 
Douglas’ tenure on the bench, the only valid patent was one that escaped 
review by the Supreme Court. But in a range of opinions, Justice Douglas 
successfully swung the Court to a view that patents were symptomatic of 
 
 18.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. 2204, 2204 (1980). 
 19.  CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1292–1294 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Rader, 
C.J., Concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 20.  Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2403 (2015). 
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economic concentration, abuse of contract, and exploitation of licensees and 
the downtrodden. Even though some commentators view the current Su-
preme Court’s patent scrutiny as reflecting an anti-patent bias, this charac-
terization is misleading. Justice Douglas’s stance provides the necessary 
contrast. The current Court is concerned about the uncertainties of patent 
doctrine that raises the cost of doing business. While Justice Douglas viewed 
patents as the fruit of a corrupt capitalist system, the current Court sees pa-
tents as potentially detrimental to competitive markets. Patents are not the 
fruit of business acumen but an impediment to innovation. 
The recent judgment in Kimble v. Marvel illustrates the complexity of 
the contrasting positions. In Kimble, a 5–4 opinion from 2015, a majority of 
the Supreme Court upheld the precedent of Brulotte v. Thys, a Douglas opin-
ion from 1964.21 At issue in Brulotte and in Kimble was a license term that 
required royalty payment after the expiration of a patent.22 Justice Douglas’s 
opinion, joined by seven of his colleagues with Justice Harlan dissenting, 
found such post-expiration royalty obligations in conflict with the limited 
term of a patent, under the patent statute and the Constitution.23 The decision, 
however, was not simply about pre-emption. Justice Douglas was concerned 
of the exploitative use by a large corporation, Thys, Inc., of its hop-picking 
machines licenses by farmers in the State of Washington.24 For Douglas, the 
continuing payment requirement after the right to exclude expired indicated 
overreaching by the company, leveraging its economic power to extract un-
deserved payments from the weak farmers.25 
Fifty years later, the Court granted certiorari in Kimble against several 
decades of commentary questioning Justice Douglas’ decision in Brulotte. 
While four of the nine justices, joining in a dissent written by Justice Roberts, 
would have overruled Brulotte, the majority of the justices, led by Justice 
Kagan, found no reason to overturn an established precedent.26 Even if the 
ruling was incorrect, Brulotte was an established canon that parties could 
always bargain around through various structured transactions. Upholding a 
precedent set by a recognized anti-patent justice reveals the fault lines in how 
the Court views patent law (not to mention differences of opinion as to prec-
edent more broadly, a subject worthy of separate investigation). 
 
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Id. at 2404; see also Brulotte v. Thys Co., 85 S. Ct. 176, 179 (1965). 
 23.  Brulotte, 85 S. Ct. at 177–180. 
 24.  Id. at 179. 
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2413 (2015). 
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One fault line pertains to creating clarity for business transactions aris-
ing from patents. The appeal to precedent demonstrates a desire not to unset-
tle expectations about the law, even a case as obscure as Brulotte. One sur-
prising revelation during litigation was the confession that counsel was not 
familiar with the Brulotte ruling.27 This admission seems implausible, but 
even if true, the majority of the justices were not swayed by the ignorance. 
As precedent, the rule in Brulotte had become hardwired in patent practice 
over fifty years, and reversals had to have strong justification, which the five 
justices did not discern. The four dissenters, by contrast, were skeptical about 
settled expectations as to the Brulotte decision. Not only had the ruling little 
justification in economic theory, it seemed easy to work around. Therefore, 
the Court should not uphold a precedent with such limited merit. The major-
ity recognized the way transaction attorneys could readily avoid the rule but 
would have private orderings, rather than public decisions, undo any poten-
tial damage from the rule established by Douglas. 
As one of the few patent decisions that split the Supreme Court in recent 
years, Kimble illustrates the limited consideration given to normative criteria 
in patent rulings. Douglas’ judgment was a populist one, the creation of a 
rule to protect exploited farmer-licensees from powerful patent owners. But 
the facts of the Kimble case show how the table had turned. The patent owner 
was an independent inventor and the licensee was a large corporation. The 
licensee in Kimble was taking advantage of Douglas’ rule in Brulotte to es-
cape payment obligations to the patent owner under the license. A similar 
dynamic is at the heart of Scheiber v. Dolby,28 a 2002 Seventh Circuit ruling 
that also examined the viability of the Brulotte rule. In Scheiber, Judge Pos-
ner grudgingly upheld the Brulotte decision, and the Supreme Court denied 
cert.29 What the facts of Scheiber and Kimble have in common is a suspicious 
tactic by the more powerful licensee to negotiate royalty payment obligations 
that extended beyond the life of the patent and to invoke Brulotte to avoid 
payment obligations. Contrary to Brulotte, the licensee has now become the 
more dominant party exploiting the independent inventor as patent owner. 
Needless to say, the Court does not address this shifting strategic dy-
namic in its Kimble decision.30 But it seems clear that a rule created on pop-
ulist grounds has led to anti-populist outcomes. I think that should have mat-
tered in the Kimble case. Some may question whether such consequential 
 
 27.  See id. at 2406 (“neither side was aware of Brulotte.”). 
 28.  293 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 29.  Id., cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1109 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2003) (No. 02-689). 
 30.  See generally Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015). 
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analysis are relevant to a judicial ruling. Arguably, such analysis goes be-
yond the traditional emphasis on statutory language, constitutional text, and 
precedent. But the Brulotte precedent does not rest on text at all.31 A payment 
obligation does not extend the duration of a patent. Justice Douglas finds a 
conflict between the license and the statute largely due to the unequal bar-
gaining power. During oral argument, Justice Breyer raised the specter of a 
patent owner negotiating a post-expiration payment obligation with all licen-
sees and thereby effectively extending the life of the patent through private 
agreement.32 Shades of this hypothetical appear in the majority opinion. 
Clearly, consequential analysis matters. 
Brulotte and Kimble illustrate contrasting approaches to patent law that 
suggest a reason for why the Federal Circuit is a court divided. Justice Doug-
las was a patent skeptic who created a rule that favored patent licensees. Even 
though Kimble upheld the rule in Brulotte, the Court’s approaches are quite 
different. The majority adopts a balancing approach that attempts to square 
incentives for patent owners, clarity of legal rules for business attorneys, and 
potential adverse effects on markets. The dissent, by contrast, emphasizes 
private orderings as a means to circumvent questionable precedents. What 
all approaches lack is a careful understanding of the goals of patent law. Jus-
tice Douglas sees patents solely as a tool for economic exploitation. The cur-
rent Court see patent law as reflecting a range of economic interests. Neither 
seems to have a coherent sense of patent’s purpose. While the current Court’s 
approach may be called pragmatic, especially compared to more dogmatic 
analyses, there seems to be a lack of principle. 
It is worth ending this comment with two questions. First, can appeal to 
normativity heal a court divided? If so, what principle should we pursue in 
patent law? The first question asks us to wonder if pragmatism is the best 
courts can provide. No one is advocating for impractical solutions, but falling 
back on pragmatism implies an aimlessness that is disappointing. Perhaps 
we, in whatever position we have in the legal system, are reduced to handling 
cases, nose squarely to the ground without a sense of moving forward. But 
raising our eyes to the sky can enliven us, make us emotionally richer and 
mentally grounded, and give some content, however tentative, to big words 
like progress. Normative considerations are unavoidable. 
So, what principles undergird patent law? Fascination with technology, 
love of technique, awe at science guides some in their professional pursuits 
 
 31.  See, e.g., Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1018 (Judge Posner noting that the Brulotte case is not “based 
on a (sic) interpretation of the patent clause of the Constitution, [n]or of the patent statute [n]or of any 
other statute[.]”). 
 32. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–12, Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 
(2015) (No. 13-720).   
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in patent law. But technology is not solely for technology’s sake and empha-
sis on technique can dull one’s sense of empathy by elevating things over 
people. Perhaps the desire to promote business, to innovate, to commercial-
ize can guide what we seek from patent law. While entrepreneurship and 
start-up cultures are more than buzzwords, at some point their promise gives 
way to the reality of economic downturns, single-minded competitiveness, 
and the pursuit of profits for their own sake. The principles that recur in pa-
tent law, and across intellectual property laws more broadly, are the need to 
invent, create, and tinker and the need for innovation that benefits society. 
An inventor- and user-centered patent law can invigorate the doctrinal dis-
cussions and inform uninspiring slogans such as “follow the statute.” Nor-
mativity that takes inventors and the users as the beneficiary of patent law 
can enrich debates over patent rules, refocusing attention on purpose and 
goals in constructing the law.33 
What Mr. Waxman’s assessment of patent institutions shows is the var-
ious actors and interests that drive patent law.34 But the assessment reveals a 
directionlessness that is reflected in the divisions within the Federal Circuit. 
The Supreme Court is limited in its ability to reconcile the divided court. 
What is needed is a thoughtful dialogue about why patent law was invented 
in the first place. 
 
 
 33.  See Shubha Ghosh, Managing the Intellectual Property Sprawl, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 979 
(2012). 
 34.  See generally Waxman, supra note 1. 
